The article suggests a formal model of a two-tier voting procedure, which unlike traditional voting systems does not presuppose that every vote counts the same. In deciding a particular issue voters are called in the rst round to assign categories of their fellow-citizens with di erential voting power (or weights) according to the special position or concern individuals are perceived as having with regard to that issue. In the second stage, voters vote on the issue itself according to their substantive view and their votes are counted in the light of the di erential weights assigned in the rst round. We analyze the formal and the philosophical reasons that support the model. We wish to thank
Introduction
Voting is a procedure that is applied to issues that call for a collective d ecision. Its principal attraction lies in its being a decision-making procedure through which t h e i n tegrity of a group can be maintained despite disagreement among its members about the correct or desirable way in which s u bstantive issues should be settled. And unlike other procedures of collective choice, like lottery, compromise or the exercise of sheer power, majority v ote is not arbitrary, ad hoc or oppressive. In its logical structure, voting cannot be fully re exive, i.e. its procedural conditions as well as the formulation of the issue to be decided must be antecedently given rather than put to a vote. However, some, even if not all of its rules, may be decided by v oting.
In this article we suggest a model for such a partially re exive application of voting, which o ers a way of ne-tuning traditional majoritarian procedures. We are particularly concerned with the failure of traditional voting methods to pay tribute to the di erential weight people often believe should be assigned to di erent v oters. 1 We therefore suggest the following formal model. Members of society a r e a s k ed to rank possible subsets of society, where A j B means that person prefers the subset A of individuals over the subset B to decide issue j for society. Under some assumptions we conclude that these preferences can be represented by a function V in the following way. E a c h m e m ber of society is a assigned a certain weight, and V (A) is obtained by taking the sum of these weights over all members of the set A (see Theorem 1 in Section 3). Although (assuming that all weights are non-negative) the best subset would be the whole of society, w e argue that the interpretation of the model in terms of the relative w eight of di erent categories of people can still be maintained by assigning individuals di erent voting powers that are proportional to the weights obtained in Theorem 1.
Next we deal with social aggregation of individual preferences. In Section 4 we o er axioms implying that society will assign each individual member the average weight individual members of society think he should be awarded regarding this issue. These axioms also imply that society w i l l d ecide the issue itself on the basis of the votes cast in the second stage and counted in the light of the outcome of the rst vote.
In Section 5 we analyze the case where the weights one person wishes to assign other members of society in one issue depend on the weights assigned to them in other issues. A simple continuity assumption implies the existence of a multi-issue system of weights. In Section 6 we discuss some possible objections to the model, and in Section 7 we o er some remarks on the literature. All proofs appear in the Appendix.
The Two-Tier Voting Model
One reason for the famous Arrovian impossibility result is that the input of the model, the individual rankings, reveal only ordinal rather than cardinal preferences. The reason this omission creates a problem is clear. Social ranking must aggregate and average con icting individual rankings, but ordinal preferences do not provide us with relevant information about the intensity of preferences.
The economic literature o ers at least two kinds of cardinal preferences that can be used for interpersonal comparisons. The rst is Harsanyi's 7, 8, 9] , in which preferences are represented by vN&M utility functions. The second utilizes quasi linear functions and uses money as a measure of transferable utility.
Harsanyi 8] extends the set of possible social policies by i n troducing lotteries over these policies. Allocations of medical treatment o r o f a r m y d u t y t into this framework, but so do allocations of divisible goods. Individuals and society h a ve preferences over these lotteries and a Pareto assumption links the sel sh and the social preferences: If all individuals prefer one social lottery to another, then so does society. Assuming that all preferences over uncertain outcomes satisfy the axioms of expected utility theory, Harsanyi proves that social preferences can be represented by a w eighted sum of individual vN&M utilities.
Quasi linear utilities are widely used in the analysis of public goods. It is well known that if all individuals have a u t i l i t y of the form m+u(x) (where x is the public good and m is money), then the e cient quantity of the public good is obtained at the point w h e r e P u 0 i (x) = c 0 (x), where c is the cost function.
There are situations in which both methods seem unsuitable. Consider issues like a: abortion rights, b: freedom of expression, and c: ban on male circumcision. Suppose a person supports all three (that is, he is in favor abortion rights and freedom of expression, but opposes male circumcision), and in that order. It is not clear how h e c a n a n s w er the question: What p makes you indi erent b e t ween \(a :b :c) with probability p and (:a :b c) with probability 1 ;p" a n d \ ( :a b :c)." It is also not clear that individuals would be willing to compromise their convictions for money. In other words, both standard cardinalizations of preferences cannot be applied here.
The present model compares individual attitudes towards controversial issues not only by the intensity of individual preferences (as is the case in utilitarianism and quasi linear functions) but also by t h e a verage weight m e mbers of society are willing to give t o e a c h other's preferences. These weights may re ect people's willingness to rely on the privileged insight o f s o m e o f their fellow-citizens, 2 but they are also the result of people's realization that some members of society feel more strongly than others about some issues and that this should be taken into account in the social choice. As a tool of interpersonal comparisons, the present model agrees with some recent social choice models in which social concerns become part of each person's characteristics (see Estlund 4] , Wol 15] , Segal 14 ], Karni and Safra 12], and Karni 11] ). But it di ers from these models in one important aspect: The tool that is used for interpersonal comparisons is external and not internal.
That is, what is compared is not how individuals feel about the issue, but how other people feel about these individuals. We discuss the rationale for this tool in Section 6 below.
The inclusion of the other-regarding concern for the way people consider a c o n troversial issue breaks the atomistic structure of the one-phase vote and expresses social solidarity, w h i c h is after all the presupposition and the aim of all procedures of social choice under circumstances of disagreement. Living in a community rather than in an arbitrary aggregate of detached individuals means that the question how m uch should one person's preferences or beliefs weigh cannot be determined independently of what everyone thinks of that question.
A t wo-tier procedure is attractive i n c o n texts in which v oters might h a ve reasons for assigning extra weight to particular categories of people on the basis of their alleged privileged position, moral standing, or particular sensitivity to the outcome of the substantive decision. 3 The procedure relates to issues about which there is not only rst-order disagreement regarding the right answer but also a second-order dispute concerning the kind of issues they are or the kind of people who should be entrusted to deal with them. Thus, in market-like situations, in which individuals make c hoices exclusively according to what would satisfy them most (and regard others as behaving on a similar basis), a two-phase system makes no sense, since individuals are expected to assign equal weights to all members of society. But then many social choices are not of this nature, for they often involve moral or ideological views about the di erential standing of members of the group with regards to the measure to be decided. That is to say, they involve s o m e k i n d of an evaluative, moral judgment of people's preferences. 4 Take, for instance, abortions. Some may w i s h t o g i v e w omen more weight than men because of the particular position of the pregnant w oman with regard to her own body. Others may g i v e e v erybody an equal vote on that matter on the basis, for example, of their view that the decisive i s s u e i s whether the fetus is a human person rather than how the interests of the pregnant w oman are a ected. Or, one might take a di erent view according to which theologians (or physicians) should be given extra weight. Another example relates to funds that are transferred from the rich to the poor. Some might hold the view that those who gave the money should have a particular say on the way it is distributed among the needy, while others might believe that the question should be left to the recipients, who know best what they need. These are not necessarily questions of self-interest, since people who are neither on the giving nor on the receiving end may n e v ertheless have strong views on the matter. In a democratic procedure, we claim, this second-order 3 The model we are o ering here is abstract and idealized and should not be understood as a proposal for electoral reform. We are aware of the di culties in its actual implementation, particularly of the question of the categorization of individuals, which might b e associated with stigmatization and pro ling. The fact that a gives b a v oting power as a person of a certain type does not mean that b wants to identi ed as such a t ype. 4 Frankfurt 5] claims that beyond their rst-order desires and preferences, individuals also have second-order evaluations and rankings of these rst-order desires, rankings which are not based merely on the strength or intensity of the desires. One's moral self-identity is de ned in terms of those normative assessments of the relative force of one's desires. Our model might be understood as an inter-personal analogue of Frankfurt's theory of intra-personal two-tier judgments. disagreement should also be democratically settled. 5 The presentation of our model will bene t from setting it on the background of its two major alternatives: the aristocratic and the democratic. The rst consists of a voting procedure that includes only a subset of the group within which the social choice is applied. This subset, endowed with the voting power, may consist of a special class of individuals like priests, noblemen, men, people with some income or property, professionals, or even, in the limiting case, one individual who happens to be blessed with certain unique qualities. Aristocracy in the historical sense, oligarchy, professional committees and dictatorship belong to this category. The second, democratic model consists of the notion that everybody takes part in the vote and resents t h e i d e a o f a n y subgroup in society making decisions for the whole group.
The reasoning behind the aristocratic model is that not everybody in the group is equally positioned to take part in the decision-making procedure. There are people who are able to understand the issue at hand and those who lack that ability or, there are individuals whose interests matter and those whose interest do not count. Condorcet 1] , for instance, thought that there are some matters in which v oting should aim at the true or correct answer, and if that is so, majority v ote could be e ective o n l y i f w e limit the scope of voters to those whose average probability to get the right answer is over 1 2 . Another example relates to the limitation of the vote to men of property. Here the idea is that the subgroup consists of those whose interests matter more, either because of their gender identity or because they are the ones who pay for the policies that stand to be decided.
The justi cation of the democratic model appeals to the egalitarian idea of the inherent v alue of every individual as a human being, irrespective o f any c o n tingent attribute or particular position, and to the general skepticism regarding the claim to a privileged access to truth by a n y class of people. Thus, everybody's interest should be counted equally and no category of people should be assumed to have better standing or knowledge, either about the nature of the true interests of others or about values in general.
The model o ered here combines elements of both the aristocratic and 5 Voters might a l s o w ant to assign di erential weights to categories of voters on the basis of their epistemic authority or privileged knowledge concerning the matter at hand. Thus, one might w ant to give extra weight to both researchers and members of Humane Society on the issue of experimentation on animals, or in some contexts assign zero weight to those who know nothing about the subject, oneself included. the democratic models, both in its formal structure and in the substantive reasons supporting it. Like the aristocratic model, our approach accepts the notion of the di erential standing of individuals regarding the particular issue at hand, since on some subjects certain people are thought t o h a ve interests that count more for various normative reasons, or since they are held as more knowledgeable and able to form judgment. But since the model is skeptical about the possibility of an ideal external point of view from which the privileged subgroup(s) can be identi ed, it leaves that identi cation to the democratic process. And rather than draw from that skepticism the conclusion that everyone should be given an equal say on each matter on the agenda, it lets the di erential weights be assigned by the voters themselves. Theoretically, v oters may c hoose one of the extreme, limiting cases: either give e v eryone an equal vote, or universally consent t o g i v e one individual an exclusive p o wer to decide the matter. But again, these apparently democratic and dictatorial choices are based on an actual democratic consent rather than on an independent abstract principle.
Our idea can be dubbed \democratically elected aristocracies." But to avoid any misunderstanding it should be noted rst that unlike traditional aristocracy, e v erybody in the group is (usually) given the vote in the rst round, albeit with di erential weight. Secondly, the issues on which s u bgroups are elected to vote are highly speci c and their scope is limited, since | unlike real historical aristocratic regimes | the privilege of a particular subgroup does not run \across the board." There are no privileged members of society only members who are given a special position regarding particular social choices. In applying to the whole spectrum of social choices, both the aristocratic and the democratic alternatives to our suggested model fail to acknowledge that some individuals may h a ve a stronger say on some matters, while others have more authority on other matters.
From a political-theory point of view here lie both the attraction and the limitation of the suggested model. It is typically issue-oriented and, like referendums, provides a representation of the people's views on those ideological and moral problems that people believe should be left out of the bargaining table of ordinary politics. But then bargaining, logrolling and coalitions are the stu of politics in its rudimentary sense. Democracy does not only attempt to represent people's positions on speci c issues but rather to supply a framework for the exercise of power by \the people." Our model should not be used in the context of the election of representatives, parliamentary parties or public o cials, since in such elections the democratic ideal is essentially egalitarian and leaves no room for di erential weights. Political power lies in the capacity t o c o n trol the outcome of a wide range of issues and hence should be allocated equally but positions and attitudes on speci c issues may be subjected to di erential evaluation. 6 3 Individual Ranking
In the informal presentation of the model for a two-phase vote in the previous section we argued for the principle that everybody in society t a k es part in the vote, both in the rst phase (the assignment o f w eights) and in the second (the decision on the substantive issue). In this section we seek a formal articulation of the weights. For that purpose we propose a theoretical exercise, which w e argue is compatible with the substantive (informal) model. Our methodological claim is that from a theoretical model of ranking subsets of society as the preferred groups for making a decision on a given issue we can derive the idea of the relative w eights assigned to di erent categories of people in real-life contexts.
We assume that society is composed of a continuum of agents, say 0 1]. Consider a question that ts our domain, for example, abortion rights, the right of male circumcision, etc. (but not \how to divide a cake," and not \who is a member of society.") Each m e m ber of society partitions society into subsets which he considers relevant in this context. So for example, such a division may be \men and women," or it may be \secular and religious people." Although we assume an in nite number of members of society, we also assume that there is only a nite number of relevant partitions of society. There is therefore a nite partition that is ner than all individual partitions. Denote it by S = fS 1 : : : S N g and assume that each S i is a measurable set. For a measurable subset A of 0 1], let fA 1 : : : A N g be the set of the intersections of A with the partition S.
Each m e m ber of society has complete and transitive preferences over measurable subsets of S, where A B means \person prefers that 6 The broad distinction between election of representatives and referendums on issues leaves open the further question whether there are issues which should never be put to any democratic vote (like, for example, human rights) and whether there are issues which may be put to a vote but only in a one-tier method (like the election of representatives). The second assumption suggests looking into the subsets of those individuals who are excluded from the decision making process. The rationale is the same as before. If someone prefers a certain group A over B to make a social decision, it also means that he prefers that SnA will be excluded from the decision making procedure to SnB to be thus excluded. Of course, A and SnA fully determine each other, but concentrating on each represents di erent p o i n ts of view. The scaling and the residual scaling assumptions highlight this duality.
The third assumption compares two sets A and B that have the same size of individuals of type i . The preferences between these two s e t s d o n o t change when the common size of the set of individuals of type i changes, provided the modi ed A and B still have the same size of type-i individuals.
The preferences induce preferences over X = Q N i=1 0 (S i )], so wlg we will use the same notation . Let p = ( (S 1 ) : : : (S N )). Consider a set of the form X(I a ) = fa 2 X : 8i 2 I a i = a i g, that is, X(I a ) i s t h e set of sets where the size of social sections in I is xed at the a i level. For a 2 X, de ne a(I a ) b y a i (I a ) = a i for i 6 2 I, a n d a i (I a ) = a i for i 2 I. Consider the following two conditions in which w e apply the logic of the scaling and residual scaling assumption to the constrained set X(I a ).
(I a ){Scaling Let We s h o w in the proof of Theorem 1 in the appendix that these two axioms follow form scaling, residual scaling, and complete separability.
The geometric di erence between complete separability a n d t h e l a s t t wo axioms is clear. The former imposes no restrictions on the preferences when one coordinate is xed, but connects together such preferences for di erent levels of the xed coordinate. The latter axioms do not impose any connection between the orders obtained for di erent levels of the xed coordinates, but impose restrictions on the induced orders themselves.
Consider the following possible objection to complete separability and the (I a ){scaling axioms. Suppose there are three groups in the social partition: clergypersons, lay men, and lay w omen, and the issue is abortion rights. One may be indi erent b e t ween A = ( 1 0 0 800 0) and B = (100 0 400), but not between A 0 = (500 800 0) and B 0 = (500 0 400) (a violation of complete separability) or between A 00 = (100 160 0) and B 00 = ( 1 0 0 0 80) (a violation of (I a ){scaling). We reject this intuition for the following reasons. It is implicitly assumed in these examples that there is a reason to check t h e power of clergypersons, a goal which i s n o t a c hieved in B 0 and B 00 . But rst, it should be emphasized that we d o n o t k n o w h o w individual members of di erent groups are going to vote and hence do not have a reason to limit their power in the light of their particular views. Secondly, the preferences are not over committee-like representations, but over the position of members of society and their role in the process of social decision making. To t h a t extent, the presence of more or less individuals of one category in a given set should not a ect our appreciation of the weight of other categories of people who form the set.
The monotonicity assumption is obvious, and is slightly stronger than what is needed for the proof of Theorem 1 (which only requires S ? ).
Strict monotonicity m a y b e c hallenged similarly to the complete separability assumption on the grounds that if A has too little representation of category S i , increasing representation of type j 6 = i may reduce the desirability of this group. Our previous arguments are relevant here as well.
Theorem 1 Assume N > 3. The following two conditions are e quivalent.
1. The preferences over the subsets of S satisfy the assumptions of scaling, residual scaling, complete separability, continuity, and monotonicity.
2. There a r e numbers k 1 : : : k N , unique up to multiplication by (the same)
positive constant , such that the preference r elation can be r epre-
If monotonicity is replaced with strict monotonicity, then the numbers k 1 : : : k N are all non-negative.
Given the uniqueness up to multiplication by the same constant , t h e weights k 1 : : : k N can be normalized. We will adopt the normalization X k n (S n ) = 1
Suppose that on the issue of abortion rights society recognizes three groups: clergy (10% of the population), lay men (45%), and lay w omen (45%), and that we nd out that person assigns these groups the weights (1 2   3  4 3 ), respectively. G i v en a set A, he is indi erent b e t ween enlarging it by adding one lay w oman or by t wo l a y men. In other words, in his view, and with respect to this issue, lay w omen should count t wice as much a s l a y men.
But of course, society does not face a choice between subsets S. Moreover, even if it did, the strict monotonicity assumption implies that everyone considers S to be the best set to make social decisions. Given this constraint, person can still express his view that \one lay w oman should count t wice as one lay m a n " b y giving women twice the voting power of men. In other words, we can imagine person assigning f(x) coupons to member x of society, where the constraint i s
His views on the di erent groups can be expressed by giving each clergyperson one coupon, each l a y w oman 4 3 coupons, and each l a y man 2 3 coupons. 7 In the formal presentation we imagined each v oter as ranking all possible subsets of society for making the decision for the whole of society. Despite the appearance of contradiction, there is no inconsistency between the informal presentation of the two-tier voting model and the formal one. For, the complete ranking of all subsets is merely a theoretical tool for expressing the relative w eights each individual wishes to ascribe to categories of people in society as a whole. It does not imply an actual wish by the individual that a subset of society make the choice for all the rest anymore than a consent o n a R a wlsian Original Position implies a blueprint for a political body in which actual social choices would be made. Thus, the merit of representing the actual assignment of di erential weights to all members of society in terms of the ranking of subgroups that are allegedly given the power to make c hoices for society as a whole lies in its ability to circumvent the problem of the cardinalization of preferences. It should not be understood as a disagreement between individuals about who in society should decide policies for all the rest, since it is universally agreed that all individual members should take part in the decision making process. By democratically elected aristocracies we do not mean an exclusive club or caste, but a range of relatively growing weight o f v oting power given to categories of all individuals in society. 7 Note that coupons here represent v oting power rather than the means of acquiring resources as is the case in Dworkin's 3, pp. 65{71] famous desert-island auction. Dworkin explicitly says that the \clamshells," distributed equally between the islanders, can be used only to purchase privately owned resources and that the issue of the equality of political power should be \treated as a di erent issue." But beyond the obvious di erence between the distribution of power (or speci cally voting power) and that of personal goods (which, for Dworkin raises the fundamental problem of envy), there is a structural similarity i n that both kinds of coupons must be allocated equally (i.e. the number of clamshells must be the same or, in our case, the sum of assigned weights must be 1).
Aggregation
The analysis of the previous section yields the conclusion that each member of society w ould like to assign the voting weights k( ) = ( k 1 ( ) : : : k N ( )), P k n ( ) (S n ) = 1 to society's N subgroups. Given these individual preferences, society t o o , w e suggest, should assign such w eights, and these should be based on the individual weights. This section discusses such an aggregation. Our aim is to obtain a rule that applies to all possible pro les of individual preferences (subject to some structural constraints), and not just to one given pro le.
Denote by K the set fk 2 < N + : Unanimity Suppose that for some and i, and for all 2 0 1], g i ( ) = f i ( ). Then ' i (g) = ' i (f). The rst axiom assumes that the aggregation procedure is indi erent t o the proper names of the members of society. By itself it does not imply that the aggregate weight of one group is independent of the aggregate weights of other groups. The second assumption is of course stronger than plain unanimity, i n w h i c h i f e v eryone agrees on the weight of a certain group, society too should apply this value. Here we apply unanimity to (relative) changes, rather than to the particular views themselves. One may a r g u e that other forms of unanimity are possible, for example, if for some b and i, and for all 2 0 1], g i ( ) = f i ( ) + b, then ' i (g) = ' i (f) + b. A s w e show in Theorem 2 below, this form of unanimity follows from the above two assumptions. We suggest the proportional form of unanimity a s i t s e e m s to t in its nature with the general setup of the present model, where the ratio between the weights of di erent groups plays an important r o l e ( s e e t h e discussion following Theorem 1 in the preceding section).
The unanimity assumption is stronger than it may seem. Notice that it is made with no regard to what happens to the weights individuals wish to assign to other groups. But when the individual weights of one group are all multiplied by , other weights too must change. As we show i n t h e proof of Theorem 2, this assumption implies in particular that the social aggregation of type i (say \female doctors") depends on the way m e m bers of society e v aluate this group but not on the way they evaluate other groups (e.g., \male lawyers").
Theorem 2 Assume N > 3. T h e s o cial coe cients k i satisfy for all i,
In other words, the social coe cients are the average of the individual coefcients. This Theorem may seem patently wrong, as clearly homotheticity d o e s not imply linearity. But as stated above, the Theorem utilizes a technical constraint that does not appear explicitly as an assumption, namely, t h a t the sum of social and individual weights must satisfy eq. (1). Therefore we show that ' i is homothetic with respect to a large set of points, hence linear.
Multiple Issues
So far, our analysis assumed just one issue, say \abortion rights." But suppose society has to decide simultaneously on several issues, for example abortion rights and the scope of sexual harassment. If members of society s e e n o connection between these issues, and judge each in isolation, the analysis of the last section still holds. But what happens if the weights people are willing to give to some subgroups of society depend on the weights these groups receive on other issues?
Consider the above example. Even if we don't know h o w a n y g i v en man or woman is going to vote on the issues of abortion rights and the scope of sexual harassment, some may feel that women should be given more voice on both issues. Suppose person believes that in both cases women's weights should be twice as that of men. If society disagrees, and gives women no special vote on one issue, it is conceivable that will be willing to compensate women by o ering them more weight on the other issue. We do not suggest that person is trying to manipulate society b y misrepresenting his true assessment o f the weights men and women should receive, but that the weights he is willing to assign them may depend on the empathy he feels towards women, and knowing that they got too little weight on one issue increases his sensitivity to their needs and views on other issue. But then, will society be able to nd weights, one system for each issue, such that individual and social weights are consistent with each other?
Suppose society has M issues to consider. To simplify notation, we assume that the same partition S 1 : : : S N of agents applies to all M issues. Extending the analysis of the previous section, we n o w assume that each member of society has preferences over decisive subsets of S for issue m, m = 1 : : : M . These preferences satisfy the assumptions of Section 3, but they may n o w depend on the weights each of the N categories receive on other issues. Thus, for issue m, person has the preferences m (k ;m ), where k ;m are the social weights to all groups in all other issues. Since, by Theorem 1, these preferences are representable by the linear weights k(m k ;m ), we express the following continuity assumption in terms of these weights, but the translation into continuity of the preferences themselves in k ;m (via measurable subsets of 2 S 2 S ) is simple. 
Q & A
Are the one-phase and two-phase systems really different? The fundamental idea behind the model is that it acknowledges the limitation of the traditional assumption about the self-interested behavior of voters and the need to give expression to the way v oters consider the standing of others in the matter under dispute. But cannot this other-regarding aspect be incorporated in a one-phase vote? Formally, consider the following procedure. Each member of society rst determines the weights he wishes to assign to each of the subgroups S 1 : : : S k , as suggested by Theorem 1. He then computes the outcome of the prospective actual vote according to these weights and proceeds to cast his personal vote on the substantive issue according to that outcome. Will this simpler mechanism yield di erent results from those of Theorem 2?
The answer is yes, for two reasons. Firstly, a s m e n tioned above, there are many cases in which t h e i n terests of a particular subgroup are not at all identi able although one may think that the subgroup is in a special position to decide the issue. For example, one might b e l i e v e t h a t w omen have a particular standing with regards to abortion policies, although one does not know h o w w omen will in fact vote on them (since they may b e n o less controverted in the female subgroup than in society at large). Secondly, even when the interests of the subgroups are known, the one-and two-phase procedures may yield di erent outcomes. Consider the following example.
Suppose k = 2 , (S 1 ) = 0 :2 and (S 2 ) = 0 :8, and suppose that all members of S 1 vote the same (say, \ Y es") on a certain issue, while all members of S 2 vote in the opposite way. All members of S 1 and 1 4 of the members of S 2 (that is, 40% of the whole population) believe that the appropriate weight of members of S 1 is 5 while the weight of members of S 2 should be 0. The remaining 3 4 of S 2 (that is, 60% of the population) believe t h e w eights should be 2:4 and 0:65, respectively. Karni 11] ). We agree with the assumption of these recent models that social concerns should be taken as part of the individual's characteristics and in particular that these social concerns may di er from one person to another. Social concerns in our model are represented by the weights each individual is willing to assign to other members of society. Preferences enter our analysis in the second phase of the voting, when social questions are actually decided.
The crux of the theoretical motivation behind the suggested model is the following: unlike the standard attempt to devise a voting scheme that would best represent the preferences of individuals in a social context, our starting point is that what is to be represented is not only what people prefer (weighted and aggregated), but also how people regard the relative weight of all members in counting and weighing their preferences. It is an attempt to represent the normative value of individual preferences as it is determined by e v erybody, rather than merely re ect the positive values of the preferences themselves. To that extent, our model is a combination of positive and normative factors, where normative v alues determine the weights voters receive, and the nal vote re ects actual individual preferences. Should negative weights be permitted? Theorem 1 permits negative weights, but the strict monotonicity assumption rules out this possibility. I n our context this is a natural assumption as well as politically justi able. The fundamental motivation for assigning di erential voting power is associated with the principle of empathy to others and the attempt to reach some sort of social consensus despite substantive disagreements. Assigning negative weight to another's opinion or preference runs against this democratic spirit of solidarity. F or although one could in principle agree that he himself should get zero weight in a particular vote (for instance, admitting that he knows nothing about the subject or is indi erent to the con icting interests), no one would probably agree to being given a negative standing, since that would mean that one is systematically wrong, irrational, or malicious in his preferences and hence should be discounted rather than merely not counted. We sometimes think that the fact that a certain person makes a particular choice or holds a certain belief is in itself a reason to make the opposite judgment or choice (e.g. in deciding whether a certain movie is worth seeing, we might act contrary to the recommendation of a friend whom we k n o w t o h a ve bad taste). However, these cases of \counter-authority," in contradistinction to \lack of authority," are not typical of the political contexts of social choice with which w e are concerned. 8 The exclusion of negative w eights also carries the extra bonus of escaping the most conspicuous temptation to vote strategically, although, admittedly, does not remove that threat completely. If I know that I am assigned a negative w eight b y many v oters, I have a strong motivation to cast my v ote for the opposite option to the one I believe i n . W e h a ve on the whole avoided the problem of strategic voting, both since we w anted to theoretically constrain ourselves to a relatively ideal model of representation and because by prohibiting negative w eights the motivation to vote strategically decreases as a matter of empirical fact.
Some Remarks on the Literature
The literature on voting and social choice consists of many attempts to revise the \positive" preference-based, self-centered approach b y i n troducing into it a normative a s w ell as a social (other-regarding) dimension. It might therefore be illuminating to show t h e w ay i n w h i c h the model outlined here di ers from and goes beyond these attempts. John Stuart Mill 13, pp. 137{143, 180] suggested granting extra votes to the more educated classes in society. Mill's idea, shared by some contemporary followers (see Harwood 10] ), is that a system of \plural voting" would promote the public education and through that the quality of both the public debate and the outcome of the political decision-making process. Mill even believed that it would lead to the advancement of moral excellence. However, a system of plural voting, like most other suggestions for the improvement of electoral systems, concerns objective and independently xed conditions of elections, whereas our proposal is to have these very conditions put to a vote. Mill was seeking \a trustworthy system of general examination," while we are looking for the subjective assessment o f a l l t h e v oters regarding the source of di erential authority on a particular measure. We t h us circumvent all the objections regarding both the irrelevance of education for intelligent political choices and the problems in deciding the appropriate levels of education. We also avoid Mill's painful oscillation between his basic egalitarian commitment a n d his elitist faith in the authority of the educated classes.
Political philosophers have expressed reservations about the preferencebased principle of voting. Estlund 4] , for example, argues that the common notion of democracy is incompatible with the idea of an epistemically i d e a l observer who decides social policies on the basis of individuals' preferences. Democracy is not just \for the people" but also \by the people," in the sense that it requires an act of choice, typically voting. Our model is in agreement with Estlund's \activity condition," since it not only rules out an \ideal preference reader" in the second-phase vote, but also denies an imposition of an external criterion for di erential voting, insisting rather on active v oting also in the rst phase. Estlund demonstrates that individual active expres-sions of preferences cannot be aggregated (due to their inextricable indexical character) and concludes that the object of voting must be the common interest rather than individual preferences. Our model is not committed to any particular view about the content o f t h e v ote, but suggests that members of society i n troduce their notion of the common good in the di erential allocation of voting power based on their views about the common good.
Our proposal can also partly respond to Wol 's 15] \mixed motivation problem," according to which some people vote on the basis of their narrow personal interests while others vote in the light of their beliefs about the common good, the consequence being that we don't know h o w t o i n terpret the outcome of the vote. Splitting the vote into two stages can provide voters with a reasonable combination of what they believe is good or fair from a social (group) point of view and what they personally prefer the policy in question to be.
It is also worth mentioning how our suggested voting scheme di ers from the idea of agreement under an ideal veil of ignorance (of the Harsanyian or Rawlsian type). The suggested scheme is not primarily motivated by t h e i d e a of fairness that calls for background conditions of anonymity in the exercise of self-interested voters, but rather by the ideal of adequately representing the way real people actually evaluate others' interests. It is not the procedural fairness of the method that lends the outcome its validity as just, but the sensitivity to individual substantive e v aluations of the di erential weights democratically assigned to identi able groups of people in society. and b n a, s a y b n a. By continuity, there is a su ciently high n such that there exists a point a n 2 L for which b n a n a b. By the above arguments, the chord a n b n ] is an indi erence set of . Denote by c n the intersection of this chord with the chord 0 f ], where f is the point o n t h e boundary of H\X for which b 2 0 f ] (see Fig. 1 ). Clearly, a n c n , ab. B y t h e scaling assumption it follows that there is a point d n 2 L, strictly between a and a n , s u c h that b d n , a contradiction to Lemma 1. The scaling and the residual scaling assumptions therefore imply that on 40gp, the preferences can be represented by a linear function.
Note that the above analysis applies equally to the case where b is in the triangle 40hp in Fig. 1 . We therefore conclude that for all b 2 XnL, t h e preferences over the intersection of the half plane containing L and b with X can be represented by a linear function. The proof of (I a ){residual scaling is similar. 2
Similarly to the above analysis, it follows that for every (I a ) and for every b 2 X(I a ), on the 2-dimensional plane H through b and L(I a ) (that is, the plane that is determined by the three points b, 0 ( I a ), and p(I a )), the preferences can be represented by a function that is linear on each of the two s i d e s o f L(I a ) i n H.
The preferences over the product set X are continuous and completely separable, and can therefore be represented by an additively separable function of the form
(see Debreu 2] and Gorman 6] 
which is similar to the residual scaling assumption of Section 3. By Lemma 3, ' 1 is linear on H j on both sides of the chords 0 . Indi erence sets of ' i are planar, and parallel on any t wo dimensional plane, hence ' i can be represented by a linear function. By unanimity, ' i is linear, and by the distribution indi erence assumption, it is the average of f i .
.
